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ABSTRACT: This paper addresses safety culture on tankers and bulk carriers and which factors affect the
safety culture onboard vessels. The empirical setting for the study is the Norwegian shipping industry. Safety
management is a challenging issue within shipping for several reasons. First of all, life and work onboard a vessel
is a 24 hour activity and the crew has few possibilities of interacting with the surrounding society. Secondly
the geographical distance between the on-shore organization and the vessel may affect both the quality of those
systems and plans developed on shore and their implementation on the vessels. The ship management is thus
identified as a key factor to a sound safety culture along with the on shore crewing strategy.
1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper we will discuss the safety culture within
the Norwegian shipping industry with tankers and bulk
carriers, and identify which organizational factors may
affect this particular safety culture.
In Norway, shipping has for several centuries
been the principal trade, and Norway as a maritime
nation has roots way back in the Viking age. Today
Norway is one of the five largest shipping nations in
the world, after Greece, Japan, Germany and China. In
the third quarter of 2007 the Norwegian foreign-going
fleet comprised 1,795 ships, the highest number ever
in Norwegian history, of which about 49 percent are
flying under the Norwegian flag (Nærings- og handels-
departementet 2007). The remaining 51 percent may
register in any of the world’s more than 150 flag states.
Norwegian shipping companies employ some 57,000
seamen from more than 60 different nationalities and
of which about 30 percent are Norwegian Nationals
(Norwegian Shipowners’ Association). The crew may
be recruited and managed by the shipping company
itself, or by one of the world’s many professional crew
hiring companies. Within the Norwegian fleet, most
sailors are contract-employees working on different
vessels during each enrolment, which results in con-
tinually shifting working groups. The situation today
is a result of a structural change dating back to the
60s and 70s when technical development allowed for
bigger vessels with more automation and monitoring,
along with the need for reorganization to improve effi-
ciency. This resulted in a cut in the crewing level. Later
in the 80s a global recession caused further structural
changes; flagging-out, use of external crewing agen-
cies and signing on crew from developing countries
and lower wages (Bakka, Sjøfartsdirektoratet 2004).
However, the shipping industry is today facing new
manning related challenges as there is a global short-
age of manpower, this is due to three main challenges:
First, it is less attractive nowadays to work in the ship-
ping industry. Second, the recruitment for ship crews
has been slow. This has resulted in the third situation
where the liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipping sec-
tor is drawing crew from the tanker industry, and the
tanker industry in turn is drawing people from the dry
bulk sector.
In 1894 the British Board of trade carried out a
study which showed that seafaring was one of the
world’s most dangerous occupations, and it still is
(Li, Shiping 2002). Regulations in order to reduce
the risk at sea were introduced about 150 years ago.
These regulations initially encompassed measures to
rescue shipwrecked sailors, and further requirements
for life-saving equipment, seaworthiness and human
working conditions. Traditionally the safety work has
focused on technical regulations and solutions even
though experience and accident statistics indicate that
most of the accidents at sea somehow were related
to human performance (Bakka, Sjøfartsdirektoratet
2004). However, a few very serious accidents at seathat
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occurred in the late 80’s resulted in a change towards
how safety was organised, and more focus was given
to the human barriers and how the seafarers’ work-
ing conditions were affected by organisational and
managerial factors—both on shore and at sea. Along
with this the term safety culture started to gain a
foothold also within shipping. The idea of safety cul-
ture within shipping was officially introduced on the
4th November 1993 by the adoption of a new reso-
lution, the present SOLAS Convention 1974 Chapter
IX, entitled ‘‘Management for the Safe Operation of
Ships and for Pollution Prevention’’, also known as the
International Safety Management Code (ISM Code)
(Le Meur 2003).
Hence, the main purpose of this paper is to elaborate
the following questions:
– What characterises safety culture on tankers and
bulk carriers?
– Which factors affect the safety culture on board
vessels?
With reference to shipping, this article will more
concretely analyse crewing strategies such as out-
sourcing of crewing management and the extended use
of contract employment instead of permanent employ-
ment. Our hypothesis is that these conditions may con-
tribute to an unfavourable and error-inducing working
environment, i.e. poor communication between shore
management and the ship management and the remain-
ing crew, unworkable procedures, lack of loyalty to
the organisation, dysfunctional interaction, fear of
reprisals, which again counteract the development of
a safety culture.
2 APPROACH TOWARDS SAFETY CULTURE
There seems to be no clear consensus concerning
the ontological, epistemological, and methodological
questions related to the topic of safety culture. The
main differences seem to be
1. Definition of the scope of safety culture and the
relationship between culture and climate.
2. Which methods are regarded as most suitable for
measurement.
3. The relationship to other organisational (safety-
related) aspects (Cooper 2000, Guldenmund 2000,
Neal, Griffin & Hart 2000, Peterson, Ashkanasy &
Wilderom 2000, Sorensen 2002, Yule 2003).
However, it is not the scope of this paper to prob-
lematise the concept of safety culture. As a point
of departure we will apply Schein’s definition of
organisational culture:
‘‘A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the
group learned as it solved its problems of external
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Figure 1. Reciprocal safety culture model (adopted from
Cooper, 2000).
adoption and internal integration, that has worked
well enough to be considered valid and, there-
fore, to be taught to new members as the correct
way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those
problems’’(Schein 2004).
Further we have decided to use a methodologi-
cal framework presented by Cooper (2000), and the
application of this framework will be discussed below.
Cooper (2000) introduces a reciprocal model of safety
culture that allows the multi-faceted and holistic nature
of the concept to be fully examined by using a trian-
gular methodology approach, depicted in Figure 1.
Cooper’s (2000) model contains three elements:
1. The subjective internal psychological factors i.e.
attitude and perceptions.
2. Observable on-going safety related behaviour.
3. The organisational situational features.
According to Cooper (2000) these elements reflect
those accident causation relationships found by a
number of researchers, such as John Adams, Herbert
William Heinrich and James Reason. The investi-
gation of several serious shipping accidents such
as Herold Free Enterprize (Department of Transport
1987), Exxon Valdes (National Transportation Safety
Board 1990) and Scandinavian Star (Justis- og poli-
tidepartementet 1991) is also congruent with their
findings. The Herold Free Enterprize accident was
partly caused by members of the crew not following
best practice, but was also due to managerial pres-
sure from the organization’s upper level to sail as early
as possible, along with other mistakes made by the
on-shore management. Two years later when the US
tanker ‘‘Exxon Valdes’’ grounded, the accident inves-
tigation determined several probable causes linked to
human errors induced by managerial faults in the upper
levels of the organisation. At the vessel, the third mate
failed to properly manoeuvre the vessel, possibly due
to fatigue and excessive workload. The master failed
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to provide a proper navigation watch, possibly due to
impairment from alcohol. At the onshore part of the
organisation, the shipping company fails to supervise
the master and provide a rested and sufficient crew
for the ‘‘Exxon Valdez’’. In addition to this effective
pilot and escort services were lacking. The follow-
ing year, in 1990, there was a fire on the passenger
liner ‘‘Scandinavian Star’’. In the aftermath of this
accident the investigation brought into focus organ-
isational and managerial faults with regard to a lack
of competence and training, but also weaknesses in
the wider social-technical system. These weaknesses
consisted of ownership separated from management,
unsatisfactory control routines by the flag state and,
in general, an overall maritime system with a lack of
transparency. Further, Cooper’s (2000) three elements
will be outlined more in detail, starting with safety
related behaviour.
2.1 The importance of safety related behaviour
Herbert William Heinrich work (published in 1931
Industrial Accident Prevention) is the basis for the the-
ory of Behaviour-Based Safety (BBS), which holds
that as many as 80–90 percent of all workplace acci-
dents are caused by human error and unsafe acts
(Tinmannsvik, 2008). Schein’s (2004) definition of
culture does not clearly address observable behaviour
patterns, but behaviour is regarded to be partly
determined by a person’s perceptions, feelings and
thoughts. However, Schein (2004) regards behavioural
patterns as a manifestation of a culture existing at a
higher level in the organisation, and not as culture
itself. When it comes to BBS, the current theories
posit that safety culture, and a reduction of accidents
may be achieved through continuous attention to three
domains:
1. Environmental factors such as equipment, tools,
physical layout procedures, standards, and temper-
ature.
2. Person factors such as people’s attitudes, beliefs,
and personalities.
3. Behaviour factors, such as safe and at-risk work
practices, referred to as the Safety Triad (Geller
2001).
When adopting this approach humans are seen
as a cause of accidents, whereupon interventions
to enhance safety are aimed at changing attitude
or behavior (i.e. poster campaigns, training, proce-
dures and so on, or changing the technology they
operate). This orientation towards risk and safety man-
agement has traditionally been and still is adopted from
the majority of the shipping companies. The BBS-
approach has been criticised for placing too much
responsibility on the people operating the systems,
assuming that they are responsible for the outcome
of their actions (Dekker & Dekker 2006). An alterna-
tive view is to recognise human error not as a cause
of accidents, but as a consequence or symptom of
organisational trouble deeper within the organisation,
arising from strategic or other top level decisions.
This includes resource allocation, crewing strategy
and contracting (Dekker, Dekker 2006, Reason 2001,
Reason, Hobbs 2003). An organisation is a complex
system balancing different, and often also conflicting,
goals towards safety and production in an aggressive
and competitive environment (Rasmussen 1997), a
situation that to a large extent is current within ship-
ping. The BBS approach towards safety often implies
that more automation and tighter procedures should be
added in order to control the human actions. However,
the result may be that more complexity is added to the
system. This in combination with the organisation’s
struggle to survive in the competitive environment,
leads to the system becoming even more prone to acci-
dents (Perrow 1999) (Dekker & Dekker 2006, Reason
2001, Reason & Hobbs 2003). However, the concept
of focusing on the human side of safety is not wrong.
After all, the technology and production systems are
operated, maintained and managed by humans, and
as the final barrier towards accidents and incidents
they are most of the time directly involved. The pro-
ponents of the BBS approach argue that behaviour
control and modification may bring a shift in an organ-
isation’s safety culture, also at the upper level, but this
is most likely if the focus is not exclusively addressing
observed deficiencies at the organisation’s lower lev-
els (DeJoy 2005). DeJoy (2005) calls attention to three
apparent weaknesses related to the BBS approach:
1. By focusing on human error it can lead to victim-
blaming.
2. It minimises the effect of the organisational
environment in which a person acts.
3. Focusing on immediate causes hinders unveil-
ing the basic causes, which often reside in the
organisational environment.
Due to this, we will also include the organisational
environment in the safety culture concept, as proposed
by Cooper (2000).
2.2 The relation to organisational factors
When human error is not seen only as a cause of acci-
dents, but as a symptom and consequence of problems
deeper inside the organisation, or what Reason (2001,
2003) refers to as latent organisational factors, empha-
sis is placed on weaknesses in strategic decisions made
at the top level in the organisation. These strategic
decisions may reflect an underlying assumption about
the best way to adapt to external factors and to achieve
internal integration, and if they are common for most
shipping companies an organisational culture may also
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be revealed (Schein 2004). Schein (2004) also stresses
the importance of leadership. The top management
influences the culture as only they have the possibil-
ity of creating groups and organisations through their
strategic decisions. And when a group is formed, they
set the criteria for leadership and how the organisation
will support and follow up their leaders. The leaders, at
all levels on shore and at the vessel, are also key figures
in the development of a safety culture. It is their task
to detect the functional and dysfunctional elements of
the existing culture, and to channel this to the upper
levels of the organisation. In return, the upper levels of
the organisation should give their leaders the support
necessary in order to develop the desired culture.
3 METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
Cooper’s (2000) framework put forward the impor-
tance of methodological triangulation in order to grasp
all facets of the cultural concept. The internal psy-
chological factors are most often assessed via safety
climate questionnaires. Our approach is to start with
such a survey in order to gain insight into the seafarer’s
perceptions and attitudes related to safety, along with
self-reported work behaviour related to risk taking,
rule violation and accident reporting. The survey also
includes questions related to crewing strategy, which
opens up the possibility of assessing the relation-
ship between the organisational situation and actual
behaviour. The survey results are used to determine
which organisational factors are most likely affect the
safety culture, and to define research areas for a further
qualitative study.
3.1 Development of questionnaire items
The survey instrument was developed by Studio
Apertura in collaboration with DNV and SINTEF. The
development was based on an evaluation of seven
already existing questionnaires in comparison with
various theoretical views of the safety culture con-
cept (Studio Apertura 2004). Minor adjustments were
made after a pilot for use within the tanker and bulk
carrier sector. This resulted in a questionnaire with
constructs and accompanying number of items as pre-
sented in table 1. All items were measured on a 5 point
likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly
agree, or very seldom/never to very often/always.
3.2 Questionnaire sample
A total of 1574 questionnaires were distributed to 83
randomly selected Norwegian controlled tankers and
bulk carriers. All vessels were flying a flag on the Paris
MOU white or grey list. 76 vessels returned a total
of 1262 completed forms, which gives an individual
Table 1. Questionnaire constructs and number of items.
Construct Number of items
Top management’s safety priorities 3
Local management 7
Procedures & guidelines 7
Interaction 18
Work situation 8
Competence 5
Responsibility & sanctions 7
Working environment 9
Reporting practices 10
response rate of 80% and a vessel response rate of
91.5%. The survey was carried out in 2006.
3.3 Statistical analysis
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS)
v.15.0 was used to perform all of the analysis, which
included descriptive statistics, exploratory factor anal-
ysis (EFA), confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and
bivariate correlation analysis.
With regard to the EFA, the principal component
analysis with Varimax rotation was carried out. The
factors were extracted based on the three following
analytical criteria: (1) Pairwise deletion, (2) Eigen
value more than 1, and (3) factor loading more than
0.50. Of the extracted factors, all factors with 2 or
fewer items were removed, based on the notion that a
factor should be comprised of at least three items to be
robust (Pett, Lackey & Sullivan 2003). A confirmatory
factor analysis (CFA), using a one-factor solution for
each construct, has also been performed. The advan-
tage of the CFA is that it allows for more precision in
evaluating the measurement model (Hinkin 1995), and
the results were compared with the EFA for providing
validity evidence based on the hypothesis that a valid
instrument should produce similar results.
Each factor was then evaluated using the Kaiser-
Meyerto-Olkin (KMO) parameter, and only factors
with KMO value at 0.60 or above were included in
the further analysis (Hair 1998).
This was followed by a scale-reliability test. For that
purpose, the Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient of internal
consistency was calculated, and evaluated along with
inter-item statistics. Cronbach’s Alpha is a measure
of scale reliability concerned with the proportion of a
scale’s total variance that is attributable to a common
source, presumed to be the true score of the latent
construct being measured. In our case that will be
the safety culture. Usually a value above 0.7 is con-
sidered acceptable, although some advocate an alpha
level of 0.8 or better (Netemeyer, Sharma & Bearden
2003). As the alpha value is a function of, inter
alia, the average inter-item correlation; the inter-item
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correlation and item-total statistics have also been
evaluated. Rules of thumb suggest that the item-total
correlation should exceed .50, and the inter-item cor-
relation should exceed .30 (Hair 1998), but it should
not exceed .80. An inter-item correlation exceeding
.80 suggests that items are duplicates of one another
(Pett, Lackey & Sullivan 2003). Then the remaining
items went through a last CFA, a five-factor solution,
in order to provide each factor’s explained variance.
Finally, correlation analysis has been carried out
in order to evaluate the construct validity, which is
viewed as the extent to which an operational measure
truly reflects the underlying safety culture concept,
and if they operate in a consistent manner.
Based on this analytical process, five factors (1)
interaction, (2) reporting practices, (3) competence,
(4) local management, and (5) work situation were
found to be reliable and valid. The aforementioned
factors are presented further in detail in the next
section.
4 RESULTS
4.1 Results from descriptive analysis
Regarding demographics, 21 different nationalities are
represented. The Filipino contingent forms the largest
group constituting 63% of the sample, followed by
the Norwegian group with almost 11%, and the Polish
which represents 9%. The last major group was the
Russians with 6%. The other remaining 17 nationali-
ties were represented in a range from 3% to 1%.
There is also great variation with regard to employ-
ment conditions. All in all, 12% of the sample
consists of permanent employees, of whom 80% are
Norwegian and 16% from the European Union. 91% of
the Norwegians are permanent employee. The remain-
ing 9% are apprentices, substitutes or newly employed
on probation. Only 3% of the non Norwegian sailors
are permanent employees. With regard to the Filipino
seafarers, the largest nationality, 99.6% are contract
employees, most on 9 month contracts (62%), fol-
lowed by 6 month contracts (27%). The extended use
of contract employment is reflected in their experience.
All in all, 85% had three years or more experience
within shipping in general. However, 69% of the sam-
ple had worked on the current vessel for only 1 year
or less.
The employment terms were in general different for
the captains. The captains normally do not have sailing
periods that exceed 6 months. The most typical sailing
period for the captains is 3 months or less.
4.2 Results from factor analyses
From the 9 theoretical safety culture constructs, a
five factor solution was derived, (1) interaction, (2)
reporting practices, (3) competence, (4) local manage-
ment, and (5) work situation. With regard to the ‘‘local
management’’, ‘‘competence’’ and ‘‘work situation’’
factor both EFA and CFA result in final solutions con-
sisting of the same items, but with minor differences
in factor loading. The CFA included three more items
in the ‘‘interaction’’ factor than the EFA, and the final
factor, ‘‘reporting practices’’ resulted from only the
CFA.
Four of the constructs did not pass the reliability
tests. The first, ‘‘top management’s safety priorities’’,
was excluded due to low representative reliability
across subpopulations. This construct also consisted of
too few items. The remaining three constructs, ‘‘proce-
dures and guidelines’’, ‘‘responsibility and sanctions’’
and ‘‘working environment’’ were excluded due to
low validity, mostly resulting from poor theoretical
relationship within the items of each construct.
For the further analysis the results from the CFA are
used. The 5 factors in question are presented in Table 2
along with number of items and explained variance.
Each factors Cronbach’s alpha value and inter item
statistics is presented in table 3.
The alpha values range from .808 to .878, and the
internal item statistics are all within the recommended
levels. The five factors are therefore considered to be
a reliable and valid reflection of the underlying safety
culture concept.
Further, table 4 presents the correlation coefficients
between the factors, or safety culture dimensions. All
correlations are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
Table 2. Final factors, number of items and explained
variance.
Number Explained
Factor of items variance
Interaction 8 35.63%
Reporting practices 5 9.77%
Competence 4 7.12%
Local management 3 5.96%
Work situation 3 5.08%
Table 3. Final factors, Cronbach’s alpha and inter-item
statistics.
Inter-item Item-total
Factor Alpha range range
Interaction .878 .360–.606 .520–.724
Reporting practices .808 .335–.761 .491–.668
Competence .839 .497–682 .628–.712
Local Management .866 .692–.716 .724–774
Work situation .817 .512–.749 .554–.739
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Table 4. Factor correlation matrix. Pearson’s r.
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5
F1: Interaction 1
F2: Reporting
practices .352 1
F3: Competence .639 .323 1
F4: Local
management .474 .362 .367 1
F5: Work
situation .494 .322 .441 .444 1
The five safety culture dimensions correlate in
a positive direction, which is consistent with the
theoretical concept, and they are therefore considered
to be a valid reflection of the underlying safety culture
construct.
5 DISCUSSION
All three constructs have a good alpha level, and as
the alpha levels are concerned with the variance that
is common among the items, these constructs also
reflect the areas where it is possible to speak about
safety culture. With reference to Cooper’s framework
towards safety culture, we will further discuss how
the organisation’s factors such as crewing strategy,
witch includes employment terms, rotations system
and policy towards the on board shipping management,
may affect the on board safety culture and climate
represented by the identified dimensions. The organ-
isation’s structural factors are all to be found within
Cooper’s element of situation, while the identified
safety culture dimensions are to be found within the
elements of person and behaviour.
Interaction is the dimension accounting for the
largest proportion of the total explained variance, with
35.63%, meaning that with regard to safety culture
most of the variance in the original data is explained
by this dimension. When taking into account how
distinctive a ship is as a work place, this is no sur-
prise. A ship may be characterised as a total institution
since both work and leisure time happen at the same
place and with few possibilities to interact with the
surrounding world (Goffman 1968). In such a set-
ting the crew members are socialised into a common
culture and rules of interaction. Schein (2004) refers
to this as internal integration. The interaction climate
is characterised by lack of stability within the crew
due to different terms of employment. First of all,
permanent employment seems to be reserved for the
Norwegian sailors. Sailors of other nationalities are
almost all contract employees. In addition, the length
of contract varies and all crew members have different
dates for signing on and signing off. Schein (2004)
points out that lack of stability may be a threat to the
possibility of developing a culture: ‘‘( . . . ) there must
be a history of shared experience, which in turn implies
some stability of membership in the group.’’ Even if
the crew as a group is in constant change, they all have
common history as seafarers. So even if lack of stabil-
ity within the group indicates that a common culture
should not develop on the ship, a common culture of
how to act and interact may have developed amongst
the seafarers, and when a new crewmember is signed
on a new vessel, he knows what is expected from him.
However, the question is if such a culture is a safe
culture? Reason (2001, 2003) emphasize that to reach
a safe culture, the organisation should strive for an
informed culture where those who manage and operate
the system, both on board and on shore, have current
knowledge about the factors that determine the safety
of the system as a whole, which again depends on that
the crew on board are prepared to report their errors
and near misses, and the reporting practice is one of
the dimensions deriving from the analyses, explaining
9.77% of the variance. This dimension also includes
feedback on reported events. In order to attain good
reporting practices, the organisation should strive to
create an atmosphere of openness, trust and loyalty.
Integrating into the group is also a survival mecha-
nism, and every crewmember will most likely make an
effort to integrate. If not, he would most likely have a
hard time during his contract period with no possibility
to leave the vessel and the other crewmembers. How-
ever, to compromise oneself and be open about one’s
own mistakes is not always an easy task, especially not
in an unknown working environment. Something that
may reinforce the crewmembers’ fear of reporting their
own mistakes is the ongoing practice that each crew
member is evaluated by their senior officer/captain,
and based on this report get recommended or not
recommended for re-hire. Interviews have revealed
that this evaluation practice differs. Some practise
an open evaluation where all parts are involved, with
focus on how to improve the evaluated crew’s short-
comings, and where the shore organisation seeks to
ensure that the evaluation is conducted in as objec-
tive a way as possible. At other vessels, the evaluation
is closed for insight by the evaluated and may also
be highly subjective. Some of the respondents have
expressed that by reporting, their next contract may be
at stake, or they may meet with other negative conse-
quences. So, lack of stability and constantly changing
working groups may sacrifice a trusting and open envi-
ronment, and thus also the sailors’ commitment to
safety.
A crew committed to safety is essential, but not
enough. Lack of competence may cause a situation
where the crew do not identify potential dangerous sit-
uations, or create them. Competence, which accounts
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for 7.12% of the total variance, is in this setting com-
prised of activities performed on board the vessel, and
is all under the control of the captain, training, drills
and familiarisation when signing on. Also, the com-
petence dimension does correlate strongly with the
interaction dimension with a correlation coefficient
at .639. This indicates that a situation when the sailors
are feeling confident with the nature of their task also
results in a better interaction climate where conflicts
are more likely to be absent. As with the interaction
climate, competence will also be affected by the crew
stability. A crew member that is constantly signing on
new vessels and that has to interact with new crew
members and leaders, uses more effort adapting to
the new situation, working out how things are done
at that specific vessel, the informal structure onboard
and so on. When more stability is provided, more effort
may be placed on upgrading their competence, and the
competence will be kept within the vessel and organi-
sation. Both the training activities and crewing strategy
may be controlled by the ship management, and thus
these safety culture dimensions are also, to a certain
degree, controllable.
The dimension of work situation consists of pro-
active activities as Safe Job Analysis (SJA), safety
evaluations and the possibility they have to prioritize
safety in their daily work. So how may the organisa-
tion affect this? For one, they may supply sufficient
crew. Today many vessels are sailing with a smaller
crew at the same time as new standards and resolutions
like the ISM-code increase the amount of paperwork
to be done. Both own observations and interviews
reveal that inter alia check lists and SJA are done in a
mechanical manner. This may originate from various
reasons such as an overload of work, no understanding
of the importance of those activities, lack of feedback
or improper planning by the local management.
The local management dimension, accounts for
5.96% of the explained variance, and the direct effect
of local management is relatively small. However,
local management is considered to have an indirect
effect on the safety climate through the managers,
or senior officers, affect on the interaction climate,
competence and training activities, reporting practices
and the work situation. Again we wish to focus on
the importance of stability within the work group.
Most captains have a sailing period of 3 months or
less, while most of the non Norwegian ratings have
a sailing period of 9 months. Most senior officers
also have a shorter sailing period then an ordinary
rating. Then a rating possibly has to deal with sev-
eral different leaders during his stay. And each captain
and department manager’s leadership style may vary,
and are sometimes even destructive, as shown by fol-
lowing comment from a Pilipino engineer. ‘‘The only
problem on board is the treatment of senior officers to
the lowest rank. (. . . ) There are some senior officers
who are always very insulting towards jr. officers and
rating.’’ Schein (2004) regards the leader as an impor-
tant key figure in the cultural development. At sea
the captain holds a key role. The captain is the one
in command at every vessel, and according to Schein
(2004) the captain’s orientation will affect the work-
ing climate, which precedes the existence of a culture.
So, in a situation where lack of crew stability impedes
the development of a safety culture, the role of the
captain is even more vital. Also, it is important to
take into account that the leadership style that is prac-
tised on board not only affect the sphere of work, but
also time off. However the Captains themselves may
not be aware of their own importance, or how they
affect safety. Most Captains, or other department lead-
ers for that matter, do not have managerial training
or education. When adopting a cultural view towards
safety, as in this research, in as opposed to a behaviour
based view, more emphasis is placed on organisational
factors. Decisions regarding crewing strategy, employ-
ment terms and managerial development programmes
are all strategic decisions made on shore. With ref-
erence to Schein’s culture definition, we will argue
that the safety culture originates within the organ-
isation on shore. Based on Scheins’ definitions of
culture there ought to exist a pattern of shared basic
assumptions that may solve the problems the shipping
industry is facing. Our case however has revealed an
offshore practise characterised by extended use of con-
tract employment, lack of stable working conditions
on board the vessels, and little or no use of managerial
training and development. This practice does not pro-
mote a good safety culture and is considered to has a
negative effect on the overall safety level.
6 CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this paper was to analyse the character-
istics of the safety culture on Norwegian tankers and
bulk carriers, and identify what organisational factors
may affect the safety culture on board vessels. Statis-
tical analysis identified five safety related dimensions
on board the vessels: interaction climate, reporting
practices, competence, local management and work
situation. Within shipping the interaction climate is
characterised by unstable working conditions. Under
such conditions it is difficult to achieve and maintain
a stable crew, and proper management becomes even
more important. Also the Captain has a vital role, as
he has the possibility to directly affect all the other
safety related aspects through his own leadership style.
The Captains, officers and ratings normally have dif-
ferent employment terms and shift terms. This may
jeopardise the development of a sound safety culture
as the crew has a poor possibility of developing com-
mon behaviour practices and a mutual understanding
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of how to do things right. As neither the Captains
nor the officers normally have any managerial train-
ing, their leadership styles often affect the safety in
a negative direction. The on board situation is to a
large extend considered to be created by the on-shore
crewing strategy and management policy.
In order to develop a sound safety culture on-board,
the shipping companies should go in new directions
and pursue a crewing strategy which offers more
favourable employment terms and fixed shifts for all
nationalities, and strive for a more stable workforce.
Another measure would be to accept the Captain’s
and department managers’ roles as leaders, and offer
managerial development. A final measure will be
to develop a policy and system that ensure proper
onboard management.
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